Animal Welfare Bill - Standing Committee A

[Mrs. Joan Humble in the Chair]

Animal Welfare Bill

Clause 30 - Disqualification

Bill Wiggin: I beg to move amendment No. 58, in clause 30, page 15, line 11, at end insert
‘(e)from riding, driving or using animals.’.
Welcome back to the Committee, Mrs. Humble. The amendment was suggested by the International League for the Protection of Horses and is intended to tighten up the disqualification powers. Although its advocates are pleased with the disqualification provisions already in the Bill, it has been pointed out to me that the provisions to disqualify convicted offenders from riding, driving or using animals are noticeably absent. The Bill contains provisions to place restrictive sanctions on the activities of those who have committed an offence under this legislation: subsection (2) prohibits them from owning, keeping or controlling animals. The amendment would be a logical extension of those provisions.
For example, if someone has committed a cruelty offence against a horse, it is only right that when they are punished, the magistrate has the option of prohibiting them from engaging in any form of contact with such animals in future. The amendment is brief, but it would be helpful to add to the Bill a reference to riding, driving or using animals.

Ben Bradshaw: The Government have some sympathy with the reasoning behind the amendment, although we are concerned about enforceability. We would like to reflect on the matter between now and Report.

Bill Wiggin: I am grateful for that tremendously positive opening to this morning’s proceedings. On that basis of co-operation, I am more than content to beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 30 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 31 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 32 - Section 31: supplementary

Bill Wiggin: I beg to move amendment No. 179, in clause 32, page 16, line 44, leave out subsections (3) and (4) and insert
‘(3)In giving directions which specify the manner in which an animal is to be disposed of, the court may not direct the disposal of an animal to any person except—
(a)a licensed breeding establishment,
(b)a licensed pet shop,
(c)a licensed Scottish rearing establishment,
(d)a veterinary surgeon, or
(e)any other person of who the court is satisfied has the appropriate training and qualification in, and experience of, animal welfare.’.

Joan Humble: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 131, in clause 32, page 16, line 45, after ‘regard’, insert
‘to the interests of the animal and’.
No. 112, in clause 32, page 16, line 45, at end insert
‘(aa)the interests of the animal.’.
No. 32, in clause 32, page 17, line 7, after (3)’, insert ‘(aa)’.

Bill Wiggin: I shall speak only to amendments Nos. 179 and 131. The former would add to the Bill a list of ways in which an animal may be disposed of. My concern is that animals be disposed of in a way that is in their best interests. Subsections (3) and (4) make no mention of how an animal is to be disposed of and instead focus predominantly on protecting its value. In my opinion, we should predominantly be concerned with protecting the animal’s welfare first. Its value is also important, but should be secondary.
The amendment would restrict the persons into whose care a court could dispose of an animal. We would not want an animal to be disposed of to a person whose animal welfare credentials, although not questionable, were still unproven. For example, if a court is to dispose of a cat in the context of its being re-homed, and even if another cat owner would like to take possession of it, the first person who should take care of the animal should be an accredited animal carer. That would unquestionably preserve the animal’s best interests, which is what this brief amendment is designed to do.
Amendment No. 131 is similar and supports the arguments that I have made for amendment No. 179. We need to ensure that the Bill states that we are acting in the animal’s best interests. I hope that the Minister accepts this helpful addition to his drafting.

Norman Baker: Amendments Nos. 131 and 112, which is in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, North-West (Greg Mulholland), are driving in the same direction. It is important that the interests of the animal are recognised, if not paramount. I am bound to say that the way in which the clause is written strikes me as belonging to a previous era, rather than the one that we are trying to usher in with the Bill. I hope that the Minister will be sympathetic to the direction of travel set out in the Liberal Democrat and Conservative amendments, and that, if he is not happy with the form of words used, he will at least undertake to consider the concept and to return with something that would satisfy us.

Ben Bradshaw: Before I address the amendments, I will just mention that for, technical reasons, we are reviewing the wording relating to the reimbursement  of expenses in the clause. If necessary, we will present amendments on Report, but they will not mean a substantive change.
Amendments Nos. 32, 112 and 131 would require a court to take account of an animal’s interests when exercising its powers under clauses 31 and 32. As with amendment No. 130, which we discussed on Tuesday, I am happy to reflect further on these amendments, although I have some reservations and will wish to ensure a coherent approach throughout the Bill.
Amendment No. 179 attempts to restrict the category of people to whom the court can direct an animal to be disposed of. That would be an unnecessary restriction on the freedom of the court to make a judgment in each case about who is the most sensible person to take on the care of such an animal. The person to whom the animal was given would become at least temporarily responsible for it and therefore subject to the welfare offence. The courts will make it their business to consider whether the person who is given the animal is capable of caring for it properly. The amendment also appears to consider only companion animals and would, for example, prevent the courts from sending farm animals to market or slaughter. I can reassure hon. Members that, should it become obvious in the future that the absence of this requirement was causing animal welfare problems, we would issue appropriate guidance to the courts.
Subsections (3) and (4) are necessary to ensure that the interests of the owner or keeper of a seized animal are protected. That is particularly relevant in the case of farm animals, where a whole herd or flock may be seized. On the basis of those arguments, I urge hon. Members not to press their amendments.

Bill Wiggin: The Minister has already said that he is thinking about the matter. Perhaps when the clause was drafted, farm animals, rather than companion animals, were at the front of the drafter’s mind. We are most grateful for the Minister’s assurance that he will consider the issue. We recognise some of the difficulties with the wording of the amendments, but if he has taken on board our concern that the court should regard the interests of the animal as paramount, I am more than content to withdraw my amendment. I look forward to seeing what comes forward on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 32 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 33 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 34 - Destruction of animals involved in fighting offences

Greg Mulholland: I beg to move amendment No. 34, in clause 34, page 18, line 4, at end insert
‘, where it is reasonable to presume that a threat to public safety exists’.

Joan Humble: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 181, in clause 34, page 18, line 15, leave out ‘destroyed’ and insert ‘disposed of’.
No. 183, in clause 34, page 18, line 31, at end insert—
‘(6A)In this section, references to disposing of an animal include destroying it.’.

Greg Mulholland: I will not dwell on the amendment because I am keen to make progress as this is our last day. The matter was touched on in the discussion on clause 29. I just want to reiterate that the issue in this case is clarity. As the clause stands, it does not specify what
“other than the interests of the animal”
refers to. It is rather worryingly vague. We are trying to make it clear that there needs to be a reason, and the reason that we suggest is a threat to public safety. Will the Minister go over the arguments again?

Bill Wiggin: In the same vein as what the hon. Gentleman has just said, we want to change the word “destroyed” to “disposed of” in the case of fighting dogs, and indeed any other animals. As we have already discussed this morning, we want to ensure that the court does not default to destroying the animal and will instead consider disposing of it if that is safe and possible. The hon. Gentleman’s amendment refers to threats to public safety. My amendment is intended to ensure that the court can dispose of the animal.
The Minister said that in the case that we have just discussed, he would, if necessary, issue guidelines to the court. I suspect that that would be satisfactory. However, we should ensure that, under the Bill, the court has the maximum flexibility to deal with those poor creatures that have been so abused, rather than automatically destroy them.

David Drew: There needs to be clarification of what the process will be if a dog is taken into care, which is what would happen. One would hope that this line would not be taken, but we need to be clear about what we mean by the process, if there has to be one, of disposal rather than destruction. Will the Minister clarify the issue?

Ben Bradshaw: Clauses 33 and 34 allow a court to order the destruction of an animal that has been the subject of an offence. Orders under the clauses could be made against either a convicted owner who had not been deprived of his animal—in which case the animal would be destroyed, but he would be entitled to its value—or in relation to any animal to which the conviction relates, even if the person convicted of the offence in relation to that animal is not its owner. If I mutilated my neighbour’s cat, a court could convict me under clause 5, and, if it were in the cat’s interests, order its destruction under clause 33. If I made my dog fight, a court could convict me under clause 7 and order its destruction under clause 34.
Hon. Members are concerned that clause 34 is the only post-conviction power relating to fighting animals and that if an animal has been involved in a fight, its destruction will be automatic. I reassure them that that is not the case. If the convicted person owned  the animal, he could be deprived of it under clause 29 and it would be disposed of under that clause. That would not only involve destruction.
Whether the convicted person owned the animal or not, if the animal were injured and suffering, it could be destroyed in its own interests under clause 33. Clause 34 is not a single route, but one of many ways of dealing with fighting animals. It gives an additional power, not available under the Protection of Animals Act 1911, to ensure that the courts have all possible means of dealing with fighting animals.
Amendment No. 34 is unnecessary; we can have faith that the courts will not destroy fighting animals unless compelling considerations of public safety override the animal’s interests. We do not think that that needs to be explicitly stated. On that basis, I urge hon. Members not to press the amendment.

Greg Mulholland: I thank the Minister for that clarification; we are largely reassured. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 34 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 35 - Reimbursement of costs relating to animals involved in fighting offences

Norman Baker: I beg to move amendment No. 35, in clause 35, page 18, line 41, at end insert
‘or had been trained so to do’.
This amendment is an attempt to tease from the Minister the conditions under which reimbursement might be applicable. Subsection (1) specifically mentions an offence under clause 7, and it seems to me that it would cover all the offences under that clause, which, among other things, refers not only to simply participating in a fight, but to carrying out arrangements for one. It covers the entire spectrum.
However, subsection (3), which I seek to amend, seems to limit the criteria applied to animals that have taken part in a fight. I wish to ensure that reimbursement might be deemed appropriate when an animal has not necessarily taken part in a fight, but has been trained to do so. In being so trained, it will have developed the characteristics of an animal that would take part in a fight and therefore the reimbursement provisions might be applicable. The Minister may be able to reassure me that the Bill says that. I detect a slight conflict between subsections (1) and (3), and should be grateful if the Minister could clarify the issue.

Ben Bradshaw: I have already agreed to consider a number of questions in connection with clause 4. If the hon. Gentleman agrees to withdraw his amendment, I shall also consider the one that he has mentioned.

Norman Baker: The Minister is being very helpful.

Bill Wiggin: Characteristically.

Norman Baker: I am thankful for that description from the hon. Gentleman. On that basis, I beg to seek leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 35 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 36 - Forfeiture of equipment used in offences

David Drew: I beg to move amendment No. 208, in clause 36, page 19, line 10, at end insert—
‘(aa)in the case of a conviction for an offence under section 5, to an electric collar or similar device or anything designed or adapted for using it;’.s

Joan Humble: With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 13—Electric collars—
‘(1)A person commits an offence if—
(a)he attaches an electric collar to an animal if he knows it to be an electric collar; or
(b)he knowingly uses or permits the use of any electric collar or similar device on any animal.
(2)A person commits an offence if he has in his possession or under his control, or offers, exposes, or advertises for sale or supply, or sells or supplies, any electric collar or similar device designed or intended for use on any animal.
(3)In this section, “electric collar” means any collar or any other device which is made, designed or adapted to transmit electric current or other electric impulse to cause shock, pain or other stimulus to an animal wearing, or otherwise in contact with, the collar or device.’.

David Drew: We reach another of the somewhat controversial elements of the Bill, and I hope that the Government will clarify what they intend to do. As is the nature of the Bill, their intent does not appear in it and there is no implication in the clause that the Government will do anything about the issue. I start from the premise that electric shock collars are cruel and unnecessary and that there ought to be alternatives. I am happy for the Government to introduce suggestions that, at the very least, would clarify the grounds on which they should be used, who they should be used by and, if there is abuse, what the consequences should be.
To refer back to the Select Committee’s pre-legislative scrutiny of the draft Bill, we were somewhat surprised that there had been no research in this area. Research has been done by some of the antagonists—those who want the devices banned—and those who believe that they are vital for training, but the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs has yet to undertake any research. I shall outline the arguments that should be considered in a moment, but DEFRA should examine this issue.
There has been an increase in the use of these products; they are ever present. I distinguish between electric shock collars and devices such as electric fences. They are different, and I prefer the latter. My friends in the Stonehouse dog training club, with whom I met regularly when I was a town councillor, told me that using electric collars is not the appropriate  way to train a dog. If hon. Members want to listen to experts, they should listen to the Guide Dogs for the Blind Association, which was very clear in the evidence that it gave to the Select Committee: it felt that there should be a ban. I am no expert in this area. I have listened to those who are, and the Kennel Club takes the clear view that it regards such collars as an inappropriate way to train a dog.
I shall take the Committee through the arguments. First, there is no evidence that the use of such collars is an effective way to train a dog or any animal. There is a lot of evidence that it will not make that much difference to dogs that have problems with barking or running away. My second argument is that there should always be an alternative method of training, and the use of collars should not be a primary source of training.
Thirdly, there is a dearth of scientific research on this issue. It must be undertaken, and given that we are considering a Bill dealing with this matter, the least I would expect from the Minister is an explanation. I hope that he will agree that we should consider the area and pursue the matter further.
Finally, there is the issue of abuse. What is abuse and what is acceptable? What can be done if a product is completely inappropriate? Are such products licensed or registered in anything other than a cursory way? I am sure that the Minister will have something to say about that.
I am aware that we use electric shock treatment on human beings, via electro-convulsive treatment, something about which I have grave misgivings, given my interest in mental health. That is a slightly different issue, inasmuch as it is connected to medical treatment. The matter under discussion is not connected to any form of medical treatment for an animal; it is about the notion that the best way to train a dog is by giving it a shock, so that it will not perform in a certain way again. That is not the right way to go about things, but I am willing to listen to the Minister to find out what proposals he might come up with at least to ensure that the matter is dealt with appropriately. At the moment, it clearly is not.

Norman Baker: I am pleased to support the hon. Member for Stroud (Mr. Drew) in his amendment and new clause. He raises an important issue. There are differences of opinion about this matter, and, looking at the Minister, I assume that on this issue, as on tail docking, there will be a free vote. Certainly, it seems that there is no party line in the Opposition parties on this issue. If there is a vote on Committee or on Report, Liberal Democrats will have a free vote.
I am concerned about the use of shock collars, as are many people who are intimately involved in the training of dogs, including well respected organisations such as the Kennel Club. A shock collar must be painful for the dog; if it is not painful, it does not work. The whole purpose of the shock collar is to inflict pain in order to guide behaviour. That is not an appropriate way forward. It hardly inspires a relationship that one would wish to see between a dog and a trainer, and it fails to exploit the positive options that are undoubtedly available, whether it is behaviour  training, advice on how to deal with a dog or other training methods that are well established in dog circles. It is a pity that people resort to cruel methods, rather than going down the route of the positive training that is available.
As the hon. Gentleman says, there is a question about scientific research, but I cannot believe that negative training is the right way forward. I am also concerned that such devices are readily available without proper advice on how they should be used. They are available on mail order and through retail outlets on the internet. They are accessible to people with limited experience of how to use and administer those devices. Even if the case could be made that they are appropriate and can be properly used, which I do not accept anyway, the devices are available to people who do not have the training and may not use them as the manufacturer suggests appropriate. The devices will be used by those who have not explored the options of positive behaviour training and have opted for an inferior method of controlling the dog, namely the use of shock collars. There is no justification for that.
There is a difference between the other devices that the hon. Gentleman mentioned and electric collars, and I can see no reason why electric shock collars should be permitted. I hope that the Government shall respond positively and treat it as a free-vote issue, recognising, as I hope DEFRA will, that there is case for dealing with such devices under this Bill.

Bill Wiggin: I can confirm that this is a free-vote issue for the Conservatives, too. I wrestled with my conscience on this matter for some time. I do not like the idea that people can zap their animal as they see fit, because it is effectively the same as hitting them. However, when it comes to sheep worrying, there is a very big problem, because a dog’s natural instinct is to want to chase sheep. Often at this time of the year, sheep worried by dogs will abort their lambs.
This is a serious duty-of-care issue for the Committee. As a result, I do not support the absolute ban, although I agree with what the hon. Member for Stroud said about fencing. The Government can deal with the matter differently from making a provision in the Bill. Farmers will shoot dogs—and they do. Farmers rightly do not ignore that power, because if one has lost control of one’s dog, the knock-on effects are serious welfare problems for the sheep. That is possibly the only excuse, but it is a good one.
The other issue is the dogs that run into the road and potentially cause huge problems, not only for motorists but for people standing by the road who may be hit by a car swerving to avoid a dog. There may be mitigating circumstances for the use of such devices. There is common ground in Committee, in that we do not want people to use electric shock collars as a torture device. We would not want such devices used on people or on any other sentient being. This is a difficult issue, and I look forward to seeing how the Minister deals with it.

Shona McIsaac: I have some sympathy with the amendment. Electric shock collars are cruel, and numerous organisations have spoken out against their use as a training method. My hon. Friend the Member for Stroud mentioned the Guide Dogs for the Blind Association, but there is also the Pet Advisory Committee, which comprises the RSPCA, the Scottish Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. the Dogs Trust, the Blue Cross, the British Veterinary Association, the British Small Animal Veterinary Association, Cats Protection, the Feline Advisory Bureau, the Pet Care Trust and the Pet Food Manufacturers Association. Many organisations have said that they are unhappy about the use of electric shock collars as a training method. Other organisations, which are not part of the Pet Advisory Committee but which have voiced concern about the use of the collars, include Battersea dogs and cats home, Dogs for the Disabled, Hearing Dogs for Deaf People, Pets As Therapy and Wood Green Animal Shelters.
My hon. Friend the Minister must consider the views of those well respected organisations on the use of electric shock collars in the training of dogs. I firmly believe that other methods could be used for dogs with behavioural problems; there are numerous other training devices. If any hon. Members do not have their eyes glued to the House of Commons Chamber on the monitors in their offices on Tuesday nights, they might want to watch a programme called “It’s Me or the Dog”, in which an animal behaviourist and trainer deals with very badly behaved dogs. The results achieved are phenomenal. We would assume that the dogs could never be trained because their behaviour is so extreme, but in fact they can be trained and their behaviour is vastly improved.
The Electronic Collar Manufacturers Association thinks that the collars are necessary and has mentioned to me their use to prevent dogs from worrying sheep or running into the road, to which the hon. Member for Leominster (Bill Wiggin) referred. I could not recall any constituents getting in touch with me to support shock collars, but apparently one did a couple of years ago. Far more constituents have been in touch with me to express their concern about the use of shock collars. That concern may derive from their own experience of having tried them and found that they do not deal with the underlying behavioural issues that might have caused the dog to bark incessantly, run away or whatever, or they may have seen the collars used.
I am sorry to say that some constituents have said that they believe that a minority of people take some pleasure in using shock collars. The hon. Gentleman says that he believes that their use is morally wrong. He does not like the idea that someone can zap a dog and cause it discomfort and pain. Some constituents have told me that they have witnessed collars being used in that manner. If people are doing so, we seriously have to consider the issue.
I hear what people are saying about electric fences and the so-called freedom fences that confine a dog to a certain area, but I am also worried about the use of electric goads and prods, which can be used in the  training of circus animals. If we are going to consider shock collars, we should also consider goads and prods. They could be grouped together as similar devices.

James Paice: I very much support what my hon. Friend the Member for Leominster has said. The Committee must avoid the trap of looking for what could be described as simplistic solutions and must respect the need for a sense of proportion. I do not like the idea of using an electric collar, but the issue of electric collars is certainly different from that of freedom fences. To me, the freedom fence is akin to the electric fencing used as standard practice for farm animals and horses all over the country. The animal gets used to a particular barrier. It may just be a thin wire that would never normally keep the animal in, but the animal learns that that is a barrier because it has received a shock. The same principle can apply to the use of an electric collar.
There is no one way to train an animal. One has only to watch television programmes or read the magazines and thousands of books on the subject to realise that experienced, competent trainers have different ways of doing things and different ideas. However, I quite agree with everybody that the use of an electric collar should not be the normal method. I also agree with the hon. Member for Cleethorpes (Shona McIsaac) and my hon. Friend the Member for Leominster that there are probably people who take some sort of vicious pleasure in using such collars. That is clearly wrong and should stop. There are no ifs or buts about it.
However, thousands, if not millions, of people in this country have their own pet dog—not necessarily a working dog—and have tried in their own best way to train it, but perhaps not done very well. Let us be realistic: we all see dogs like that when we walk round the countryside in our constituencies. We must consider what the last resort is, which is why we have to accept the existence of electric collars, albeit regulated. I look forward to what the Minister is going to say about that. I do not support an outright ban because such collars can be the last resort to break a dog of a bad habit, such as chasing sheep, running off or chasing any wild animal in the countryside. However hard the private owner has tried to train the dog, they may have failed to break that habit.
The role of the electric collar is to give a short shock. The hon. Member for Lewes (Norman Baker) is right: of course the shock is painful the moment it happens. However, it could be used to break the concentration of a dog that was chasing something. I have seen it happen and it works. Just for that split second, the dog’s mind is taken off chasing the hare—or whatever it may be—and that can be enough to make it return. The collar should not be used as part of a normal process, but it can work as a last resort.

Shona McIsaac: I am listening to what the hon. Gentleman is saying about using the collar as a last resort, but I understand that there are collars that emit a scent, such as citronella, which dogs find mildly  unpleasant. That can have the same effect of stopping a dog from doing something, given a dog’s sense of smell, but it is not as cruel as the use of shock collars. People are not as aware of spray collars as they are of shock collars. Perhaps that could be a solution.

James Paice: The hon. Lady is right: there is a citronella spray collar. There are also collars that emit a screech—a loud noise—to break the dog’s concentration. We are talking about anything that breaks the dog’s concentration on whatever it is chasing or whatever course of action it has set its mind on. However, I would not necessarily say that any one method is right or wrong. I agree with the hon. Member for Stroud that there is a dearth of scientific knowledge about the issue, and there is clearly room for further investigation. At this stage, without that scientific evidence, it would be wrong to go for an outright ban.
We should regulate collars in some way, and I look forward to hearing what the Minister says, but they have a role to play. It would be wrong to assume, as some hon. Members seem to be doing, that everybody who has a dog is brilliant at training it. That is not the reality. Many people are not that good at training their dogs—I probably stand as one of them—and we must understand that, in the long run, collars are probably in the dog’s best interests. If a bad habit is not broken, the dog’s behaviour may only get worse and it might end up being killed on the road or something like that. That is why we must find a balance: sometimes there may be a role for the short-term use of an electric collar to break a particular habit, and the dog may end up better off for it. It sounds perverse, but the question is one of balance.
I am happy to see more scientific research—indeed, I demand it—and I would certainly expect some form of control or regulation, but I would not support an absolute ban.

Barbara Keeley: Like other hon. Members, I have constituents who have voiced concerns. I want to add a couple of thoughts in support of my hon. Friends the Members for Stroud and for Cleethorpes.
An impressive list of organisations has been cited that have urged that shock collars should not be used, but two further organisations have not been mentioned. It is telling that the Association of Chief Police Officers has urged police forces not to use electric shock collars and that the armed forces dog unit recently prohibited their use. The addition of those two organisations is very convincing. The evidence seems to be piling up from organisations urging that the devices are not used.
If any group of people has an interest in not finding dogs roaming about in outside areas, it is politicians and those who work on our campaigns. I have been chased a few times by dogs in my constituency. Some hon. Members have said that electric fences might be all right, but if they do not stop other dogs, children or even canvassers venturing into the area where the resident dog is, leaving the dog vulnerable to attack as well as perhaps children and other pets, they are not  suitable. Something is available on the open market that should perhaps be used only by the smallest group, and there are even doubts about that. Clearly we have a problem. Although the scientific evidence is lacking and people that there has not been enough research, a convincing range of organisations is saying, “Do not use these devices”.

Greg Mulholland: We have had interesting and excellent debates on many clauses. Although I have not always agreed with the outcome, I have been persuaded that some of the arguments have a great deal of merit. However, the idea that an unacceptably cruel and unnecessary practice is justified because a dog might chase sheep or run into the this is probably the weakest argument against an amendment that we have heard. We all know that, to follow the country code, one’s dog must be on a lead. If people are irresponsible enough not to do that, their dog can be shot by a farmer. I do not believe that anyone has a problem with that. Children might run into the road. Do we seriously suggest that, because a child might run into the road, we should allow the use of shock collars for children also? I am afraid that the arguments being made are spurious. We cannot allow people’s inability to manage an animal properly, or their irresponsibility, to justify such means.

James Paice: I believe that relating the discussion to children running on the road lowers the tone of what has been a good debate. The hon. Gentleman said that the country code requires dogs to be kept on a lead. Yes, it does. But in the country, many people do not obey the country code. We may not like that, and it may be wrong, but it is a fact of life. Politicians have to understand what goes on in the real world, rather than having a starry-eyed vision of everyone abiding by every law, rule and convention. Many dogs in the countryside are not kept on leads. The implication of what the hon. Gentleman says is that if, as a result of that, a dog runs into the road and gets run over, that is tough luck. I should have thought a short, sharp shock would be preferable to the dog’s being run over.

Greg Mulholland: I am afraid that that demonstrates how weak the hon. Gentleman’s argument is because it is entirely irresponsible not to have a dog on a lead by a busy road. His assertion is quite ludicrous. The dog should be put on a lead.
I am afraid that we have failed to realise that the duty of care for animals is not simply a question of animal welfare. All dog owners, and pet owners in general, have a responsibility, which the Bill covers to some extent. They also have a responsibility in relation to the country code, and if that is not working, we should consider it in a different way. However, to use such thin arguments as a justification for what is clearly an unacceptable, cruel and unnecessary method of training is not reasonable. If it is, in the words of the hon. Member for South-East Cambridgeshire (Mr. Paice), a normal method that will not be allowed to continue, I should like the Minister to explain how that can be achieved apart from through an outright ban.

Ben Bradshaw: I would like to ensure that Committee members are clear about the effects of the amendment and new clause. They would ban any device that transmits an electric current and is designed to have an impact on an animal that comes into contact with it, which includes electric containment fences used for small animals.
I have listened carefully and have spent quite a lot of time in recent months, as Members would expect, talking and learning about such issues. Like most hon. Members here, I did not know a great deal about them. I do not own a dog myself, and I did not know a great deal about such devices before I became responsible for animal welfare. I have not simply waited to be lobbied by organisations and charities. I conducted straw polls in the pub in my constituency and in rural Devon. That somewhat tempered my instincts, which I suspect most people would share, that such collars are inherently cruel and should be banned. The hon. Member for South-East Cambridgeshire gave some good reasons why that would not be appropriate.
Some feel strongly that collars are cruel and should be banned. Equally, I have met very responsible dog owners—I am sure that they have lobbied other hon. Members—who take their responsibility to their pets extremely seriously, but who swear by such devices as a last resort. They say that the alternative in some rare cases would be euthanasia for the dog.
We are in a slightly difficult position in that there is no proper scientific evidence concerning the cruelty and effectiveness of such methods. My Department recently commissioned research into them because of the controversy and debate, including the points raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Cleethorpes as to whether comparisons between effectiveness and cruelty could be made in relation to citronella sprays. I stress that in the very rare situation highlighted by my hon. Friend where an irresponsible owner used such a device inappropriately, that owner would be subject to the cruelty clause anyway, if not the welfare clause.
Mr. Drewrose—

Ben Bradshaw: Regarding the effect of banning underground electric fences—[Interruption.]

Joan Humble: Order. I remind hon. Members and everyone else in the room that all electric devices should be switched off.

David Drew: Of course, MPs respond to electric shock treatment through their pagers.
Will the Minister say more about the research? It was not available to us when we undertook the pre-legislative scrutiny. Will it be published? Will it lead to consultation and an opportunity to look at regulations? If so, I will feel reasonably satisfied, but we need to know a bit more.

Ben Bradshaw: Yes, I can give my hon. Friend that assurance. Of course, as we have discussed before, all research into these areas will be put into the public domain if it is commissioned by Government. Research is taking place not just here, but in Germany,  where the issue is the subject of some debate. In fact, that research might be a little further down the line than ours.

Norman Baker: I understood that shock collars were banned in Germany and some other countries. That was the briefing that I received from the Kennel Club, which says that they are banned in Denmark, Australia, Germany, Switzerland and Slovenia. Is that not correct?

Ben Bradshaw: My information is that it is not. This is a Länder issue in Germany; some Länder have banned the devices and some have not. In fact, my information is that in some cases in Germany people are even allowed to use shock collars in sheepdog trials, which I do not think we would find acceptable in this country.

Shona McIsaac: Following on from what the hon. Member for Lewes said, will the Minister give a commitment to the Committee to investigate some of the research that has been done in the countries that have banned the devices?

Ben Bradshaw: We have done quite a lot of research into the information that is available. One needs to be slightly cautious about some of the lists that are published showing which countries have done things. I have discovered in the process of working on the Bill that they are not always completely accurate. That is one reason we wanted to conduct our own research.
 The impact of the amendment and the new clause would be to ban containment fences. The case for that is probably weaker than in the example of the individual shock collar. As the hon. Members for South-East Cambridgeshire and for Leominster said, in some cases one is preventing an animal that it has been impossible or impractical to contain by a wall or a fence from running away to worry, or even maul and kill, sheep, or from running on to a road and creating danger for human beings. In light of that and the Government’s commitment to draft codes and to conduct research, I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud will accept that this issue should be dealt with not in the Bill, but by means of a code of conduct and regulation once we have the research available. On that basis, I ask him to withdraw his amendment.

David Drew: I would not say that I am delighted to concur with the Minister, but we have made some progress on the issue. Certainly, I did not realise how much research the Government have been undertaking—perhaps in relation to the Bill, but possibly because the issue is out there already. I am aware that, in the amendment and the new clause, I use the words “electric” and “electronic” interchangeably. It is an electric shock, but electronic equipment. There might be some problems with the wording. I accept that that is an issue in itself. However, I ask the Minister to bear it in mind that the wider issue will not go away. At the very least, we need to recognise that proposals will have to be made in due course to regulate the industry and the use of such devices. I  remind the Minister that the Select Committee suggested that, in extremis, the use of such devices could be limited to veterinarians, for example.

Norman Baker: I am listening carefully to what the hon. Gentleman is saying. Even if it is accepted that, in some situations—perhaps those described by the hon. Member for South-East Cambridgeshire, such as when the device is used for agricultural purposes—there may be a justification for the devices, does he agree that the present situation where they are available to all, including those who do not need to use them, without any regulation at all, is unacceptable? We must find a way of limiting their availability to those who genuinely need them, rather than their being the first resort, which they clearly are for many people.

David Drew: I agree entirely, and I shall not roll over. I shall ask—rather than demand—that the Government put the process in place as quickly as possible. There is a proper debate about the evidence, so to be fair to those companies that are in the marketplace, they are given due warning that they must be able to defend their products. I know where my mind and heart lie: those devices are unacceptable in the norm. They should be banned, or for those who have to use them, regulated.
Let us consider how the Government wish to approach the matter. It was never my intention to put my proposals in the Bill; however, as we have had a very good debate, I certainly intend to consider the issue further, because it draws forth strong emotions on both sides. Those devices should not be the normal means of training a dog or, to agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Cleethorpes, any animal. However, there may be extreme reasons why they should be used by an appropriate person, as the Select Committee said. I should like to consider that evidence, and that is why I am happy to withdraw the amendment. I hope that the Government now do as they say they will, but urgently. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 36 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 37 - Orders under section 29, 31, 33, 34 or 36: pending appeals

Bill Wiggin: I beg to move amendment No. 186, in clause 37, page 20, line 13, at end insert—
‘(4A)A person appointed under subsection (4)(d) must be a person who the court is satisfied has appropriate training and qualifications in, and experience of, animal welfare in order to carry out the directions.’.
Reading my notes on the amendment, it seems that we have had most of the debate, so I shall keep my comments short. I seek to ensure that when a matter comes to the law courts, the welfare of the animals is put first in all circumstances. Subsection 4(d) gives the courts the power to appoint a person to carry out the directions that it has ordered. The amendment will ensure that that person is properly qualified. The  person will become the animal’s guardian, so they will fall under the duty of care in the Bill. We have heard that from the Minister; my amendment is a way to ensure that such a provision is in the Bill. I understand why the Minister may not want that to happen, but in the circumstances it is probably worth having this debate, so that an animal that has experienced trauma or cruelty will be looked after by someone who is properly qualified and possessed of the skills to deliver that care.

David Drew: Again, I shall be brief. To rehearse and synthesise earlier arguments, I am not sure whether the Bill is the right place to go into detail about what is implied by “animal welfare inspectors”. However, through secondary legislation or at least a code of practice, we will need subsequent clarification about the experience and qualifications that such people should bring to bear. I imagine that it will link with the veterinary surgeons Bill, which, as I said on Second Reading, I hope the Government introduce rapidly. We did not spend much time discussing that subject during the Select Committee proceedings. I hope that the Minister has something to say about what the Government have in mind, so that we know where we are going with the issue.

Ben Bradshaw: We have discussed the issue before, and although we agree that a court should appoint the most appropriate person, it is not necessary to include that provision in the Bill to achieve that goal. The person appointed would temporarily be responsible for the animal and therefore subject to the welfare offence, and I reassure hon. Members that, should it become obvious that the absence of that requirement was causing animal welfare problems, we would issue appropriate guidance to the courts. I urge the hon. Member for Leominster to withdraw his amendment.

Bill Wiggin: I rather suspected that the Minister would say that. We have already discussed the matter, and we should make some progress. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 37 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 38 and 39 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 40 - Effect in Scotland of disqualification under section 30

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Ben Bradshaw: I shall not repeat the explanations of clauses 40 to 44 in the explanatory notes. However, it may be helpful if I inform hon. Members that, on Report, the Government will move a small number of minor technical amendments to clauses 41 to 43 to keep them in line with minor changes being made to  the parallel Scottish Bill, which is being examined by the Scottish Parliament. I shall explain the amendments on Report.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 40 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 41 to 44 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 45 - Inspectors

Bill Wiggin: I beg to move amendment No. 187, in clause 45, page 25, line 10, at end insert
‘(2A)A person may only be appointed as an inspector under this section if he holds an appropriate qualification to be an inspector for the purposes of the provision in question.’.

Joan Humble: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 59, in clause 45, page 25, line 13, at end insert
‘(3A)Where a person other than a state veterinary inspector is to be appointed under this section, the appropriate national authority shall ensure that they have the necessary training, knowledge and qualifications for the exercise of their functions under this Act.’.
No. 40, in clause 45, page 25, line 16, at end insert
‘(4A)A person may only be appointed as an inspector under this section if he holds an appropriate qualification to be an inspector for the purposes of the provision in question.’.
No. 41, in clause 45, page 25, line 22, at end add
‘(7)In this section, “appropriate qualification” means—
(a)a qualification—
(i)accredited at the time of its award, and
(ii)awarded by a body accredited at that time;
(b)a qualification awarded before the coming into force of this section which the Secretary of State certifies to be treated for the purposes of this section as if it were a qualification within paragraph (a); or
(c)a qualification obtained in an EEA State (other than the United Kingdom) which is equivalent to a qualification within paragraph (a) or (b).
(8)In subsection (7)—
“accredited” means accredited by the Secretary of State; and “EEA State” means a state which is a contracting party to the Agreement on the European Economic Area signed at Oporto on 2nd May 1992, as adjusted by the Protocol signed at Brussels on 17th March 1993.’.
No. 48, in clause 45, page 25, line 22, at end add
‘(7)The appropriate national authority shall ensure that adequate additional funds are available to local authorities for the appointment and training of inspectors under this Act.’.
No. 60, in clause 45, page 25, line 22, at end add
‘(7)The appropriate authority may not include in any list of suitable persons to serve as inspectors, persons employed by organisations enjoying charitable status, or having agendas which are hostile to those activities they will be inspecting.’.

Bill Wiggin: No more Mr. Nice Guy, Mrs. Humble; this is the awkward bit. With these amendments, we are seeking to establish statutory guarantees that the persons who are classified as inspectors will be suitably trained. The Bill does not specify the necessary criteria for someone to be an inspector, acquiring powers  under this legislation. It mentions lists and guidance by the appropriate national authorities, but does not say that an inspector needs to be sufficiently qualified.
Subsection (2) gives the appropriate national authority powers to issue guidance on the appointment of inspectors. Amendment No. 187 would complement such guidance by making provision for such persons to be qualified as inspectors in the field in which they will be required to inspect. It is sensible and appropriate to ensure that inspectors are qualified and sufficiently trained to carry out their duties. Given that under clauses 16, 17 and 19 to 25, inspectors will have powers to search premises and even terminate an animal’s life, I would like to be reassured that they are competent enough to carry out those duties.
An inspector will have powers of entry. I believe that it is necessary that they are qualified to search for evidence and to treat the animals that they find. A statutory provision for inspectors to be qualified and trained would benefit the enforcement of the legislation. For instance, those who are investigating licensed premises must be qualified to do so, as they may require different levels of expertise from those who investigate animal welfare complaints. Considering the near immunity from civil and criminal proceedings that inspectors are given under subsection (5), it is especially important that these inspectors are suitably qualified. I am sure that most inspectors act in good faith, but that good faith and their judgment about reasonable grounds would be compromised by a lack of expertise.
Moreover, having suitably qualified inspectors would serve to clarify the present confusion. There are inspectors under the control of and directly accountable to Government bodies, and there are so-called inspectors who are representatives of non-governmental bodies—for example, the RSPCA—and in respect of whom there is no governmental accountability. I suggest the amendment with that in mind. Given that the hon. Member for Lewes has tabled similar amendments, Nos. 40 and 41, there is scope for progress to be made on this.
With amendment No. 60, I seek to ensure that inspectors will act impartially. Under the Bill, the words used by inspectors and their opinions and decisions could lead to prosecutions being taken against people. As inspectors will be acting on behalf of the state, we must ensure that they are impartial, otherwise confidence in the system will be jeopardised. For example, if a charity is against pet fairs and has inspectors who are empowered by local authorities to investigate pet fairs, questions about the objectiveness of their judgment could be raised. Without doubt, that would lead those who were accused of offences by such inspectors to feel that they had been pursued maliciously. I am also concerned that those who are guilty of offences will be provided with a get-out, because they will be able to cast doubt on inspectors’ competence and judgment by revealing their prejudices. The amendment would preserve the impartiality of inspectors.
I have a supplementary point to make. We need Ministers to guarantee that only inspectors under the direct control of Government bodies will receive the near immunity from civil and criminal prosecutions in subsection (5). Will RSPCA inspectors be covered by the provision? If so, the RSPCA will be getting an additional power that I do not think it wants. Will RSPCA officers be liable under subsection (6) if they are assisting an inspector who is exempt? I would be grateful if the Minister clarified that.
Amendment No. 48 would add:
“The appropriate national authority shall ensure that adequate additional funds are available to local authorities for the appointment and training of inspectors under this Act.”
Even without amendments Nos. 187 and 59, the clause might require local authorities to spend more money on inspectors to carry out the duties required of them. Given the current financial burdens on local councils and the fact that the public have little appetite for further council tax increases, I am concerned that unless extra financial resources are given to local authorities, they may be reluctant to fulfil their obligations under the Bill. I believe that a money resolution, which goes with the Bill, was laid and not objected to, so that may be possible.
If the funds were not available, licences might not be checked, complaints might not be followed up and the welfare of animals might suffer. It has been pointed out to me that, already, local authorities are not sufficiently equipped to fulfil their obligations to ensure animal welfare. Clearly, that is unacceptable. As the extra obligations stem from “the appropriate national authority”, that authority must be prepared to pay its share. I hope that the Government will seriously consider the difficult nature of the amendments and take them on board.

David Drew: I agree with the hon. Gentleman: this is an important part of the Bill. When we were discussing orders to be made, I asked for the position to be restated; it is appropriate for the Minister to answer more fully on this point. It is crucial that we know what the role and functions of inspectors are. Experience and qualifications will play a key role. If the Bill means anything when it is enacted it will be tested by the people who have to deal with the various issues that we put before the Committee. It is not totally clear to me what we mean by “the inspector”—who that person is.
In another Committee of which I was a member we made changes regarding who takes in stray dogs; responsibility passed from the police to local authorities. Having subsequently been out with the RSPCA, I could quote a couple of examples from my constituency in which there has been rather a muddle since the change in the law, because the police rightly say, “It’s not our responsibility now. Ring the local authority”, and the local authority does not have a 24-hour service. The person then rings the RSPCA, which says, “Maybe we can take the dog and find a kennel temporarily, but it’s not our responsibility any more, because it is clearly down to the local authority.”
We need to be clear whose role it is and what experience that person has. I know that the Kennel Club wants someone with a national vocational  qualification in animal care as an absolute minimum. After that, it is a relationship between that person and a vet, who could be called in when an animal was suffering or had been subject to abuse. Again, we need to think about who does what and what happens when things go wrong. I hope that the Minister will say a little more about that, because it will make or break the Bill.

Philip Hollobone: I support amendments Nos. 187 and 59 tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Leominster. I think that the arguments have been well rehearsed.
I also want to support amendment No. 48, and I declare an interest as a member of Kettering borough council. National Government must appreciate the sensitivity of local budgets to measures passed in this place. To give the Committee an example, an £44,000 increase in expenditure in Kettering borough would put 1 per cent. on the annual council tax. Therefore, the cost of appointing an inspector could have a serious implication for all council tax payers in Kettering. I hope that the Minister will take on board the sense behind amendment No. 48.

Ben Bradshaw: The amendments would impose constraints on the way in which a local authority or national authority may appoint inspectors. In practice, an inspector will either be an officer of a local authority or a state veterinary service inspector, although an authority is free to appoint someone else if it wishes to do so. Only such inspectors and police constables would be able to exercise the powers of entry, search and seizure under the Bill.
Amendments Nos. 40, 59 and 187 would ensure that a person could be appointed as an inspector only if they had suitable training, knowledge and qualifications. We do not believe that to be necessary. An authority considering appointing someone as an inspector would have regard to such matters anyway. We cannot envisage an authority wanting to appoint someone as an inspector if it did not feel that the person was able to do the job properly.

Norman Baker: As someone who has experience of local authorities as leader of a council for a number of years, I, too, know that that is simply not the reality. The reality is that local councils faced with difficult financial constraints will, under certain circumstances, when presented with new legislation and a duty from Parliament, seek to discharge that duty in the cheapest way possible. They may well nominate as an inspector an existing officer in an entirely different post. The idea that inspectors will be properly trained simply does not hold up.

Ben Bradshaw: I was going to deal with that eventuality. In case that is a problem, subsection (2), as the hon. Member for Leominster said, requires local authorities to have regard to any guidance issued by the appropriate national authority when they appoint inspectors for the purposes of the Bill. We expect that guidance to set out any relevant criteria such as qualifications, experience and training, especially in areas of difficulty, before inspectors are appointed.
Amendment No. 41 would define an appropriate qualification, and we believe that it, too, is unnecessary. We prefer the flexibility of allowing the local authority to decide for itself whether a person’s qualifications are appropriate, but, if necessary, the national authority would issue guidance to help local authorities make that decision.

Bill Wiggin: We have spent a long time discussing the importance of the duty of care, and this is a duty of care by the Government to ensure that the sentiment that we have all expressed during our sittings is written into the Bill. We want a proper duty of care, so we must insist that those who are delegated powers by the Bill can also, because they are trained properly, exercise that duty of care. The flexibility to which the Minister refers is well intentioned, but it is a grave danger, and I hope that he will reconsider it.

Ben Bradshaw: Amendment No. 48 would ensure that the appropriate national authority provided additional funding for inspectors. Licensing regimes under the Bill will be established on a cost recovery basis. Local authorities will be free to set the cost of a licence at the level they deem appropriate. The funds raised from the licence fee can be used by the authority to pay for the administration of the licensing system, including appointing and training inspectors.
Members of the Committee might know that officials in my Department are already working closely with the Local Authorities Co-ordinators of Regulatory Services and the state veterinary service on training inspectors. We are putting together a training package to help inspectors understand their new roles and responsibilities when the Bill is enacted. I am confident that it will help inspectors to enforce the Bill properly when it becomes law.
Amendment No. 60 is not necessary. Individuals will be placed on a list under subsection (3) only if the appropriate national authority considers them suitable for appointment as inspectors. No local authority would have to appoint people from that list if it did not also consider them appropriate for appointment. The point of such a list would be to help local authorities to identify individuals with a particular area of expertise. For example, there is little point in a person inspecting livery yards or riding stables if he knows nothing about horses. It is conceivable that, in future, such an individual could be a supporter or even a member of a charitable organisation, although if an individual were hostile to the activity that he would be inspecting, the national authority would not add him to the list anyway.
It would be foolish to deprive the local authority of the power to appoint an individual who may have considerable experience and expertise. If an individual employee of the RSPCA, or any other organisation, were appointed as an inspector by the national or local authority, when he exercised powers under the Bill he would do so in his capacity as a national or local authority employee, not as an RSPCA inspector.
Only inspectors appointed by a national or local authority would qualify for the immunity to which the hon. Gentleman referred. Serving RSPCA officers will not be appointed as inspectors, although they might go with an inspector, but receive no immunity. On that basis, I urge the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

Norman Baker: I am disappointed by the Minister’s response to what is a core issue. The Committee has shown tolerance by accepting the Government’s view that their hands should not be tied and by recognising such measures as enabling legislation. It has been willing to take on trust several promises that have been made about specific issues and have understood the need to do so. We are discussing not a specific issue, but a core issue concerning the implementation of the Bill; I see no reason why such matters should not be written into the Bill. The Minister has not made a case for not doing so.
The wording of amendment No. 187 is identical to that of amendment No. 40. It states:
“A person may only be appointed as an inspector under this section if he holds an appropriate qualification to be an inspector for the purposes of the provision in question.”
It is inconceivable that inspectors do not have an appropriate qualification. I fail to see the logic in not making such a provision part of the Bill. The Minister seems to envisage circumstances in which an inspector would not have an appropriate qualification. If he does not mean that, he should have no objection to accepting the form of words in the amendment. He then seemed to get into a tangle by saying, on the one hand, that local authorities should have flexibility to interpret such matters and presumably not to have inspectors with appropriate qualifications while, on the other hand, that national guidance may state such guidelines, in which case there could be no objection to the amendment.
The Minister gave the impression that there would not be proper guidance to start with and that he would wait to see how local authorities interpret the powers, but that, subsequently, at some distant date, if matters were not working out properly, he would look at issuing national guidance. That is the message that I received and it is not satisfactory. We want the Bill to be effective from day 1, and the clause is a core part of it. I hope therefore that the hon. Member for Leominster will press amendment No. 187 to a Division, or that we may press our amendment No. 40, because I am not convinced by the Government’s argument.

Bill Wiggin: Let us give the Government another chance. The hon. Member for Lewes is absolutely right. The way people treat their animals is key to what we mean by duty of care, and we must treat our legislative process in the same way. The idea that even one council could appoint someone who was not properly trained would represent a failure on the part of the Committee, which would have missed the chance to insist that people are at least properly trained. I wholeheartedly agree with him on that point.
The Minister was helpful about inspectors. He made it clear who was covered by the exemptions and provisions of earlier clauses and who was not. I am a little bit unsure about the position of an RSPCA inspector, who is also a paid-up member of the RSPCA, and visibly so—a person who is employed or wearing the uniform, whatever his technical commitment. That is a grey area. A comment from the Minister would clarify that, because it is not a fundamental sticking point.
We need to be sure that when private individuals get a knock on the door, they are completely aware of who they are dealing with,and in what capacity, in the same way that hon. Members with outside interests immediately declare them at the beginning of a debate. That sort of clarity would be helpful for animal owners, particularly as the Government have essentially shifted the responsibility for prosecuting on to the RSPCA. People should be aware of the level on which they are dealing with the human being knocking on their door. I should be grateful if the Minister said a little bit more about that for clarity—he touched on most of those points in his comments—otherwise, we may have to push one of the earlier amendments to a vote. I agree with my colleague, the hon. Member for Lewes.

Joan Humble: The Minister has not indicated that he wishes to comment, so the hon. Gentleman must make his position clear.

Bill Wiggin: I made it very clear that if the Minister did not comment we were going to vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 5, Noes 10.

NOES

Question accordingly negatived.

Clause 45 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 46 - Conditions for grant of warrant

Norman Baker: I beg to move amendment No. 42, in clause 46, page 25, line 40, at end insert
‘for a period of 10 days’.
The clause relates to the conditions for the granting of a warrant and sets out four conditions, any of which would satisfy the granting of a warrant. Those  conditions are relatively sensible. However, in respect of the third condition in subsection (4) there is no time limit set on the leaving of a notice in a conspicuous place on the premises. As a matter of good law, time limits ought to be set so that those who have premises understand what the time limit is and any court, in determining whether the third condition is met, would be able to state sensibly whether 10 days—under my amendment—had passed.
The absence of a time limit seems to leave open a defence that the notice applied to the premises was inadequate and therefore the condition was not met. It cannot be the Government’s intention to provide such a let-out.
I said 10 days, because that is a reasonable amount of time that appears elsewhere in the Bill. I have no objection if the Minister wants to say that that period should be five or 28 days, or another number, but a time limit needs to be set, and there is not one here.

Ben Bradshaw: We are not sure that the amendment is necessary, for the following reason. If a constable, for example, suspected that a disused barn was the scene of an animal fight the night before, should he or she really have to wait 10 days before searching for evidence? We appreciate that the provision deals with premises from which the occupier is absent, as well as those that are unoccupied. It would certainly be wholly inappropriate in the case of unoccupied premises to require notices to be left for 10 days before access could be granted.
As to premises from which the occupier was absent, I do not think that a court would grant a warrant in the circumstances that the hon. Gentleman is concerned about. If it was clear that the premises were usually occupied but that the occupier was temporarily absent, a court would inquire how long the notice had been left, and how long the occupier had been away, specifically to deal with the possibility that someone had gone away for a short time.
I understand the hon. Gentleman’s concern, but we are not happy about tying the courts’ hands in that way. We think that they should exercise judgment in granting warrants. When judging whether to grant access to unoccupied premises they would need to consider whether those were likely to remain unoccupied. The hon. Gentleman spoke of other legislation, but similar warrant conditions exist in other Acts. For example, the Animal Health Act 1981, as amended in 2002, contains conditions for the granting of warrants, but imposes no minimum time limit for the leaving of a notice at unoccupied premises. I urge the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.

Norman Baker: I hear what the Minister says and understand his logic, although I do not entirely agree with it. Part of the reason for leaving a notice for a specified time is to provide clarity to the courts. It is also, frankly, protection for the owner. A visit might take place, and it might well be concluded that premises such as a barn were unoccupied, or that the occupier was absent, without the owner being aware of that. The placing of a notice for a set period would  make what was happening clear to the occupier, if there was one, who might be there despite being thought to be absent.
A parallel situation would be a car that was believed to have been abandoned on a local authority highway, to which a notice was appended stating that it would be removed within a certain number of days if no action was taken. That would give the owner the opportunity to point out that it was not abandoned, as the local authority might have been led to believe, but was a car in regular use. Similarly, under the amendment, a notice would allow the owner, who might have been absent temporarily, and who returned to find a notice, to take action to demonstrate that the premises were not unoccupied. The Minister has not considered that aspect and I ask him to consider the point again, although, in the spirit of making progress, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 46 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 47 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 2 agreed to.

Clause 48 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 49 - Power to detain vessels, aircraft and hovercraft

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Norman Baker: I should like to ask the Minister a question: why is a hovercraft not included in the definition of a vessel? Why is it defined separately?

Ben Bradshaw: Subsection (6) contains a delegated power—

It being twenty-five minutes past Ten o’clock, The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

Adjourned till this day at One o’clock.